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Abstract 
Conditional logics have been developed as a basis from which to investigate logical properties 
of “weak” conditionals representing, for example, counterfactual and default assertions. This work 
has largely centred on propositional approaches. However, it is clear that for a full account a 
first-order logic is required. Existing or obvious approaches to first-order conditional logics are 
inadequate; in particular, various representational issues in default reasoning are not addressed by 
extant approaches. Further, these problems are not unique to conditional logic, but arise in other 
nonmonotonic reasoning formalisms. I argue that an adequate first-order approach to conditional 
logic must admit domains that vary across possible worlds; as well the most natural expression of 
the conditional operator binds variables (although this binding may he eliminated by definition). 
A possible worlds approach based on Kripke structures is developed, and it is shown that this 
approach resolves various problems that arise in a first-order setting, including specificity arising 
from nested quantifiers in a formula and an analogue of the lottery paradox that arises in reasoning 
about default properties. 0 1998 Published by Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. 
Keywords: Knowledge representation; Conditional logic; First-order logic; Nonmonotonic reasoning 
1. Introduction 
Conditional logics have been developed in Artificial Intelligence for representing and 
reasoning about defeasible conditionals such as “birds fly” [8,11,24]. This work in turn 
has built on earlier work using conditional logics for dealing with weak subjunctive 
conditionals, most notably counterfactuals [27,48]. The essential idea is that a sentence 
representing a default or counterfactual appears as an object in a logical theory; thus it 
makes sense to talk of a set of defaults entailing others. The semantic theory of such 
conditionals is typically developed by means of a possible worlds approach based, one 
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way or another, on a preference ordering among possible worlds. This ordering is then 
used to determine the truth of a conditional. The default statement “birds normally fly” for 
example may be represented using a weak conditional as Bird =+ Fly. The intended reading 
is something like “if an individual is a bird, then normally that individual flies”. Bird =+ Fly 
is true (roughly) if in the least (or most normal) worlds in which Bird is true, Fly is true 
also. “Penguins are necessarily birds” can be expressed as q (Penguin > Bird), and along 
with this we can consistently state that penguins normally do not fly, Penguin =+ -Fly. 
From this one can conclude that birds are normally not penguins (i.e., Bird + -Penguin is 
logically entailed). 
Given a logic of default conditionals, one can continue and define forms of defeasible or 
nonmonotonic inference. The most basic of these is given by: 
#l follows by default from a! in theory I just when 7 + a! =+ B. (1) 
Consequently one would conclude that a bird flies (by default) whereas a penguin 
or bird with a broken wing does not. This form of defeasible inference however is 
much too weak, a limitation addressed in, for example, [7,18,29,38]. The problem 
of specifying a (propositional) nonmonotonic reasoning system with “appropriate” 
properties, including appropriate handling of specificity, inheritance of properties, and 
accommodating irrelevant properties, remains an area of active research. 
However, these considerations aside, there are limitations with a propositional account 
having to do solely with representational issues. In general, a propositional logic will be 
inadequate for modelling phenomena of interest, and so ultimately one will require the 
richer expressiveness of a first-order logic. In the case of flying birds for example, “birds 
fly” refers (in some sense) to the set or class of birds, and “Tweety is a bird that flies” is an 
instance. So we might prefer to write something like: 
Vx (Bird(x) =+ Fly(x)), (2) 
Bird(Tweety) =+ Fly(Tweety). (3) 
However, if we read (2) as “for every x, if x is a bird then normally x flies” then, without 
worrying about the precise semantics, this reading is not quite right. For one thing “birds 
fly” seems to attribute a property to the class of birds; Eq. (2) on the other hand seems to 
express a normality condition concerning each individual that happens to be a bird. 
As shown in the next section, the problems run considerably deeper than this. First, in the 
obvious, naive, first-order approach there are perfectly reasonable theories that cannot be 
consistently represented. The difficulty is that a principle of universal instantiation and, in 
particular, instantiation into the scope of the conditional operator, leads to inconsistency. 
Second, a representational analogue to the lottery paradox arises in a first-order setting. 
These problems are not peculiar to conditional logic, but rather appear in other approaches 
to default reasoning. I argue that the problem arises from assuming an unfettered principle 
of universal instantiation. An alternative approach is developed where this principle 
is weakened. In this approach the aforementioned problems are satisfactorily resolved. 
Crucially, in this approach the domain of individuals may vary across possible worlds and 
the conditional operator may (effectively) bind variables. 
While this paper is motivated by and centred on logics for defeasible conditionals, 
it is intended to account for first-order issues in conditional logics in general. That is, 
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I address not just first-order conditional logics for defaults, but first-order conditional logics 
in general, including those intended to represent counterfactuals, notions of obligation, 
hypotheticals, and other subjunctive conditionals. In addition, the resulting approach is 
more expressive than found, for example, using nonmonotonic consequence operators 
[22]. As well, the results given here are relevant to other approaches to nonmonotonic 
reasoning, such as default logic and circumscription, in that they help explicate the notion 
of an exceptional individual. 
Section 2 explores issues in quantification in nonmonotonic reasoning. Section 3 reviews 
conditional logic and related work. In Section 4 an approach is developed that addresses 
problems in a naive quantificational approach. Section 5 provides a further exploration 
of this approach, while Section 6 compares it with related work. Section 7 contains 
concluding remarks. Proofs of theorems are given in Section 8. 
2. Problems with quantification in nonmonotonic reasoning 
In this section, I informally consider various problems with the “obvious” approach to 
quantification in conditional logics, and in nonmonotonic reasoning in general. Consider 
first a very standard example, where penguins are birds, birds normally fly, whereas 
penguins do not: 
Example 1. 
Vx (Bird(x) + Fly(x)), 
Vx(Penguin(x) =+ -Fly(x)), 
Vx [7(Penguin(x) > Bird(x)). 
For the time being, consider a! =+- B to represent a conditional in a conditional logic, or 
a default in some arbitrary approach to nonmonotonic reasoning. So in default logic [43], 
Vx (a(x) + #l(x)) would be expressed using the rule 
a(x) : B(x) 
whereas in a circumscriptive abnormality theory [32] it might be expressed by 
(a(x) A -a&(x)) 1 B(x). 
In these last two cases “penguins are birds” would be expressed using material implication: 
Vx (Penguin(x) > Bird(x)). 
Without going into details (but see Section 3), if we have that Opus is a penguin, and 
so a bird, then in a conditional logic (or related approach) we can conclude that Opus 
normally does not fly. Essentially, in a conditional logic, we have the information that being 
a penguin is a more specific notion than being a bird, and a definition of default inference 
(as given in (1) as a base case) can make implicit use of this information. In approaches 
such as default logic and circumscription this is not the case, and other information has to 
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be added to a theory to block the unwanted inference that Opus flies by virtue of being a 
bird. In default logic, for example, one could employ the rule 
Bird(x) : -Penguin(x) A Fly(x) 
stating that birds that can be assumed to not be penguins fly. 
A second example indicates that perfectly reasonable theories can not be handled by 
a naive approach to quantification. In this example we have another apparent case of 
specificity, but where specificity is now given by the nesting of quantifiers [3,28]. Consider 
where elephants normally like their keepers; however elephants normally do not like keeper 
Fred, who is mean; but elephant Clyde, who gets along with everyone, normally does like 
Fred. 
Example 2. 
V.Xy(EZ(x) A G(y) * Likes(x, y)), 
Vx (El(x) A Ke(Fred) + -Likes(x) Fred)), 
E&Clyde) A Ke(Fred) =+ Likes(Clyde, Fred). 
Allowing unrestricted universal instantiation, we have the instance of (5): 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
El(Clyde) A Ke(Fred) =+ -Likes(Clyde, Fred). (7) 
However in a conditional logic, E&Clyde) and Ke(Fred) together with (6) and (7) are 
inconsistent. This is clearly a significant problem, since Example 2 is straightforward and 
reasonable. In default logic and circumscription the problem is less severe. In default logic 
for example, one obtains one extension, or set of beliefs, in which Likes(CZyde, Fred) is true 
and another in which -Likes(CZyde, Fred) is true. Again, it is up to the user to hand-tool 
the default theory to eliminate the unwanted extension. 
The difficulty seems to be that in (4) what we mean to express is “elephants like their 
keepers”, while in (5) we have something like “elephants do not like keeper Fred”. In 
a sense we are talking about elephants and keepers as a whole, or as classes. But our 
treatment of quantification in the above is such that what we really have is a shorthand 
for expressing something about every individual, and this is what leads us into trouble. 
The problem is that, one way or another, we want our assertions to say something 
about elephants and keepers in general. In conditional logic, the truth of a conditional 
is determined by looking at the least worlds in which the antecedent is true. For (4), we 
should somehow exclude Fred, since he is an exceptional keeper. Similarly for (5) we 
would like to exclude Clyde in considering those worlds used to determine the truth of the 
conditional. This is the intuition that will guide the approach of the Section 4; however, first 
consider another difficulty deriving from universal instantiation involving the conditional 
operator. 
Example 3. An analogue of the lottery paradox, as applied to default properties, crops 
up in approaches to default reasoning. This is a consequence of the observation that, for 
example, every species of bird is in some way exceptional with respect to the general 
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class of birds [40]. 2 Thus penguins do not fly, ravens are black, hummingbirds hover, 
albatrosses are pelagic, etc. If we assert that all species of known birds constitutes the full 
set of species: 
Vx (Bird(x) = (Penguin(x) V Robin(n) V . . . V Raven(x))) (8) 
then as argued in [40], we essentially lose our “birds fly” default. On the other hand, if we 
decided that necessarily all species of known birds constitutes the full set of species: 
VxEi(Bird(x) = (Penguin(x) V Robin(x) V . . . V Raven(x))) (9) 
then if every species is exceptional in some manner, our knowledge base is unsatisfiable 
(unless there are no birds). 
This is a qualitative, or finitary, version of the lottery paradox [23]: given a lottery with 
some number of players, we assume that a given player typically will not will the lottery, 
but that someone does win the lottery. There are various ways that this could be stated, the 
major alternatives being the following: 
Vx (T + -Winner(x)), 3x Winner(x), (10) 
Vx(T j -Winner(x)), ElxWinner(x), (11) 
Vx(T =+-Winner(x)), T + &Winner(n). (12) 
The first equation seems to mis-state the problem, since we want to say more than that 
there simply happens to be a winner. In (11) we assert that there must be a winner, 
while in (12) we assert that normally there is a winner. While (11) and (12) capture 
two types of lotteries, both are unsatisfiable in a naive approach: we would have that 
Vx(T + -Winner(x)) logically entails T =+ Vx-Winner(x), which is inconsistent with 
the assertion that (however expressed) there is a winner. 
3. Background 
The next subsection introduces conditional logic and sketches the obvious extension to 
a first-order system. The second subsection reviews related work concerning conditional 
approaches and quantification in nonmonotonic reasoning systems. 
3.1. Conditional logic 
Our development follows that of [9] for propositional conditional logic, since arguably 
it provides the most general framework suitable for representing weak conditionals; see 
[34] for more on this approach and for a comparison of different conditional logics. In the 
propositional case, the language of the logic is that of (standard, classical) propositional 
logic augmented with a binary operator + for the weak conditional, reserving 1 for 
material implication. So the language for propositional logics of conditionals CC is the 
* Poole [40] also discusses problems that arise in nonmonotonic inference. Our concerns here are restricted to 
representational issues. 
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set of formulas constructed from a set of atomic sentences P = {pl, ~2, . . .}, the binary 
operator =+, and the standard truth-functional connectives - and 1, in the usual manner. 
The connectives A, V, and E are introduced by definition. In addition T abbreviates some 
(classical) tautology and I abbreviates -T. The operator + is the weak or variable 
conditional, expressing a subjunctive relation between its antecedent and consequent. 
Nestings of the weak conditional are permitted, although this will not be important in our 
analysis. Sentences are interpreted in terms of a model M = (W, R, P) where: 
(1) W is a set (of worlds), 
(2) R is a ternary accessibility relation on worlds, and 
(3) P maps atomic sentences onto subsets of W. 
Rwwl w2 has the informal reading “according to world w, 7.~2 is accessible from WI”. In 
logics of defaults, the intent is that w2 is no more exceptional than w 1; that is, as “further” 
accessible worlds are considered, these worlds are more “normal”. 3 
For all intents and purposes I will treat R as a binary relation on its last two arguments; 
thus the first argument is subscripted as a reminder that we are (essentially) dealing 
with a binary relation, but indexed by particular worlds. Informally this means that each 
world has its own idea as to which worlds are accessible from each other. Thus under a 
“normality” reading for accessibility, a world where gravity holds will have a different idea 
of normality than one where it does not. For conditional logics, regardless of application, 
the accessibility relation (on its last two arguments) is generally a preorder. Hence we 
assume that R is reflexive and transitive on its last two arguments. 4 I also adopt the Limit 
Assumption [27], that the order on worlds is well-founded. A necessity operator can be 
defined by q I~ = -cz + cr. That is, q a will be true just when at the least -a! worlds, a! 
is true; since there are no -a worlds in which a! is true, this means that every accessible 
world has Q true. 
In the following definitions, W, is the set of worlds “visible” from w, ]]a 1) M denotes the 
set of worlds where (Y is true, while min(w, Ilmll”) denotes the least exceptional of such 
worlds visible from w: 5 
Definition 3.1. 
W, = (WI ] for some w2 E W, Rww1w2}. 
Definition 3.2. 
3 In contrast, in a centred logic of counterfactuals [27], R w w 1 w2 means that (seen from w) w2 is closer to w 
thanW~. 
4 The resulting logic has been suggested as providing a conservative core for defaults: logical relations deriving 
from this base (so it is argued) ought to be common to any logic of defaults. This logic is also appropriate as a 
base for defining counterfactual conditionals and other subjunctives, with the possible exception of deontic logics. 
A deontic logic arguably ought not be based on a reflexive accessibility relation. However we retain a reflexive 
accessibility relation here since it eases the technical development. 
5 The following definitions make reference to +, defined next. While these definitions are interdependent, hey 
are not (viciously) circular. 
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Definition 3.3. 
min(w, Ilall”) = { wt E ]]cz]IM I forever-y w2 E ]]cY]]~ where R,,wtw2, we have 
hJW2W 1. 
Truth at world w in model M (b) is as for propositional logic, except for the =+ operator: 
(1) M,w~piforpiEPiffwEP(pi). 
(2) M,w+--criffnotM,wba. 
(3) M,w~a!>Biff:ifM,w~~thenM,w~B. 
(4) M, w bo *B iffmin(w IbIP> C IIBP. 
Thus a =k ,b is true at w when j3 holds at the least cx worlds according to R and w. So for 
the conditional Bird j Fly, we look at the “least” (if such exist) worlds in which Bird is 
true, and if Fly is true at these worlds then Bird =+ Fly is true at w. The intuition is that for 
determining the truth of a weak conditional, we factor out exceptional circumstances such 
as having a broken wing, being a penguin, etc. 
The resulting logic has some quite reasonable properties. For example, the following 
sets of sentences are nontrivially and simultaneously satisfiable: 
[Bird j Fly, Bird, -Fly), 
{Bird + Fly, Penguin =+ -Fly, q (Penguin > Bird)}, 
{Bird =+ Fly, Bird A B W j -Fly]. 
Hence, first, a bird may normally fly although in actual fact it does not; second, birds 
fly, penguins do not, but penguins are birds; and third, while birds fly, birds with broken 
wings do not. The underlying modal logic (treating R as a binary relation) is S4 [19]; 
Lamarre [24] presents a closely-related logic. Optionally we could have defined 3 in term 
of q [8]. The resulting conditional logic S is characterised as follows. 
Axioms consist of tautologies of classical propositional logic together with: 
ID. a=+a. 
CA. (a+-yr\/5?+y)>(av/3+y>. 
In addition to modus ponens, there are rules of inference: 
RCEA. From cz = cz’ infer (a, j B) G (a’ =+ /I). 
RCK. From (,!?I A . . . A/&)>Binfer(a=$Br A...AajB,)>cr~Bforn30. 
This axiomatisation is taken from [34] since it is somewhat more perspicuous than that 
of [9]. The names of axioms and rules of inference are relatively standard in conditional 
logics; see [10,35]. Notions of theoremhood, consistency, etc., are standard, as is the notion 
of deductive consequence. 
Definition 3.4. A formula a! is a deductive consequence of a set of formulas r, written 
rI-ac,iffthereare(yl,...,y,)~rsuchthatI-y,~...~y,>a. 
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In our original example, we obtain: 
{Bird + Fly, Penguin + -Fly, q (Penguin > Bird)] I- Bird =h -Penguin 
and so we can deduce that birds are not normally penguins, given our initial conditionals. 
The obvious extension to quantification is relatively straightforward. I describe it here in 
order to provide a point of departure for the subsequent approach. “Birds fly” is represented 
as Vx(Bird(x) + Fly(x)); this formula can be regarded, essentially, as standing for all its 
instances. So if this formula is true then we would expect Bird(t) =+ Fly(t) to also be true, 
where t is an arbitrary term. However, as described in the previous section, this approach 
is not satisfactory. Moreover, the problem lies not with conditional logic per se, but rather 
with allowing “unfettered” instantiation into a default; hence as described in the previous 
section, similar problems arise in other approaches dealing with defaults. 
The development follows [ 111. 6 The language is based on that of classical first-order 
logic, beginning with denumerable sets of variables, constants, and predicate symbols, but 
not, for simplicity, function symbols; again the language is augmented with the operator 
=+. The symbol V is used for universal quantification, and the existential quantifier 3 is 
introduced by definition in the usual way. Variables and constants constitute the set of 
terms in the language. Formulas are interpreted in a model A4 = (W, R, D, V) where W 
and R are as before, D is a nonempty domain of individuals, and V is a function on terms 
and predicate symbols where: 
(1) forterm t, V(t) E D, 
(2) for any n-place predicate symbol P, V(P) is a set of (n + I)-tuples (dl, . . . , d,, w) 
wherediEDforl<i<n,andwEW. 
Given a model M = (W, R, D, V), truth at world w is given by: 
(1) M, w b -a and M, w + a II fi and M, w b LX + /I are defined as in the 
propositional case. 
(2) For n-place predicate symbol P, terms tl , . ..,t,,,andwEW, 
M,w!=P(rl,..., tn> iff (V(h), . . . , V(b), W) E V(P). 
(3) For arbitrary variable x and formula CX!, M, w + Vxa! iff for every V’ which is the 
same as V except possibly V(x) # V’(x), and where M’ = ( W, R, D, V’), we have 
M’, w +a. 
Definitions of satisfiability and validity are analogous to those in the propositional case. 
This approach will be referred to as the “naive approach” to distinguish it from what 
follows. Note that, in particular, the following sentence is valid in this approach: 
Vxcz(x) 3 a(t) if t is a term free for x in a(x). (13) 
Thus from Vx(Bird(x) =+ Fly(x)) we can derive Bird(Opus) =+ FZy(Opus). 
The domain D is fixed across possible worlds, and so the Barcan formula and its 
converse (see [19], for example) are valid. Moreover the assignment of terms to domain 
individuals is also fixed across possible worlds, and so in a model terms denote the same 
domain element across possible worlds. That is, terms rigidly designate across possible 
6The propositional fragment of this logic in fact was based on a world-selection function, rather than an 
accessibility relation. This difference, for our concerns here, is irrelevant. 
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worlds. This is not a limitation, in that there is no problem also incorporating nonrigid 
terms (in Artificial Intelligence, see, for example, [26]). 
3.2. Related work 
In Artificial Intelligence, most work in conditional logic has focussed on logics for 
default statements. The base logic of the previous section provides a “core” of default 
inferences (via (1)) that arguably should hold in any logic of defaults; one may add 
conditions to augment this basic set. Alternately, by augmenting the base approach one 
may obtain logics suitable for other weak conditionals, such as counterfactuals. 
Used as a logic of defaults, conditional logics have an advantage over approaches 
such as default logic [43] and circumscription [31], in that one can reason about default 
conditionals, and it makes sense to talk of a set of defaults implying another, or of being 
unsatisfiable. Given a conditional logic of defaults, one may subsequently determine what 
nonmonotonic inferences ought to obtain. So in such approaches, representational issues, 
having to do with what it means to be a default, are separated from issues of default 
application. 7 The large majority of work in conditional logic has centred on propositional 
systems. 
Conditional logic however is but one way in which formal properties of defaults may be 
investigated. Other approaches have been based on intuitions from probability theory [36], 
or on the explicit development of nonmonotonic consequence operators [22,25]. Despite 
the diversity of approaches and intuitions, there has been a close agreement on what 
constitutes a core set of inferences that ought to be common to all nonmonotonic systems. 
Systems such as s-entailment [36] (or O-entailment or p-entailment [l]), possibilistic 
logic [12], preferential entailment [22], and CT4 [7], among others, essentially allow 
the same inferences as S, and may be taken as specifying a conservative core [37] of 
default inferences. These approaches though are too weak to constitute a general theory of 
nonmonotonicity. For example, irrelevant properties are not handled. Thus, even though 
a bird may be concluded to fly by default, a green bird cannot be concluded to fly by 
default since there may be models of a theory where a green bird does not fly. So these 
systems, while arguably adequate for representing and reasoning about sets of defaults, 
do not adequately address the problem of what nonmonotonic consequences hould follow 
from a set of defaults. Subsequent work has focussed on principled means to extend a 
system’s basic inferences. 
Again, there has been a strong convergence on means of strengthening these systems. 
Approaches including System Z and l-entailment [38], CO* [7], possibilistic entailment 
[5], and rational closure [28] all assume, in a semantic sense, that a world is as 
unexceptional as possible. This may be done by ranking default rules according to a notion 
of specificity, and then using this ranking to obtain a preference ordering on worlds (or, 
in some approaches, models). Thus, since there is no reason to suppose that greenness 
has any bearing on flight, one assumes that greenness has no effect on flight. While this 
assumption seems reasonable enough, its realisation in these systems is not unproblematic. 
7 This distinction is not clear-cut however. For example, (1) shows how a logic of conditionals may be used to 
provide a base notion of default inference. 
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In brief, these approaches fail to fully address issues of (irjrelevance and inheritance of 
properties; as well they allow unwanted specificity relations 1381. These approaches have 
been extended in various ways, including [4,16,17]. However no extension is completely 
satisfactory. Our concerns in this paper though are orthogonal to these, which address 
propositional nonmonotonic reasoning. Rather, here we look at first-order representational 
issues. 
With respect to first-order systems, there has been little work in quantified conditional 
logic. Stalnaker and Thomason [47] present an analysis of one such logic, of counterfactual 
conditionals. Domains of individuals (i.e., the range of bound individual variables) may 
vary across possible worlds; a designated set of individuals ‘D’ serves as the outer domain, 
a set of “individuals” which exist in no possible world, while a designated world k serves 
as the absurd world. The outer domain is used for the assignment of truth values to 
nonreferring terms. The absurd world serves as a technical device for handling the truth 
values of conditionals with impossible antecedents. The logic has properties that make it 
unsuitable for a logic of defaults. Foremost is the fact that if (Y is true at world w, then 
o =+ #I behaves the same as a! 2 /I at that world. Moreover, at world w there is at most 
a single “least” world accessible from w in which u is true. Lastly, quantification over 
=+ is handled roughly as outlined in the previous subsection, in that the truth of sentence 
Vn(a(x) + /l(x)) at world w is determined with respect to the domain of individuals at w. 
As we argue subsequently, we in fact want to use domains of individuals at other possible 
worlds. 
Asher and Morreau [2] describe a first-order logic for generic sentences. The propo- 
sitional fragment is weaker than the base logic S, although the authors also describe a 
process of “normalisation” whereby further inferences may be made. Again, the sentence 
Vx(dx) =+-B(x)> 3 (dc) * B(c)) 
is valid for any constant c. So quantification into + is handled basically as described 
in the previous subsection. Similar remarks may be made concerning [28], which treats 
quantification in the setting of nonmonotonic consequence relations. 
Bacchus et al. [6] present an approach to default reasoning based on statistical notions, 
wherein default reasoning is founded on a principle of indifference among possible worlds. 
Friedman et al. [ 131 develop a first-order conditional logic based on plausibility measures. 
A plausibility measure is a function that associates a notion of plausibility (a member 
in some partially ordered set) with a set of possible worlds. Schlechta [44] formalises a 
notion of “normally a(x)” using restricted quantification. In this interpretation of defaults, 
notions of preference are not relevant in the semantics; this approach is combined with 
that of preferential models in [45]. The work of Lehmann and Magidor [28], Schlechta 
[44,45] and Friedman et al. [ 131 is discussed further in Section 6. For quantified modal 
logic, Hughes and Cresswell [ 191 provide a readable introduction, while Fitting [ 141 and 
Garson [ 151 provide comprehensive surveys. 
Of other approaches to nonmonotonic reasoning, most, including default logic [43], 
circumscription [3 1,321, autoepistemic logic [33], and Theorist [39], allow quantification. 
The problems described in Section 2 appear in these systems, but in a less severe form. For 
example, the natural representation of Example 2 in default logic is: 
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El(x) A f&(y) : Like&, y) 
Likes(x, y) ’ 
E&x) A Ke(Fred) : --Likes@, Fred) 
-Likes(x, Fred) ’ 
E&Clyde) A Ke(Fred) : Likes(Clyde, Fred) 
Likes( Clyde, Fred) 
Given that E&Clyde) A Ke(Fred) is true, two extensions (or sets of default beliefs) are 
obtained, one in which Likes(CZyde, Fred) is true and one in which -Likes(Clyde, Fred) is 
true. So we do obtain default conclusions in this case, unlike the conditional analogue, 
which results in inconsistency. However, we would have to add a condition such as 
x # Clyde in the second default to block the undesirable extension. 
4. An alternative approach 
4.1, Initial considerations 
In this section I develop an alternative to the naive approach. Two modifications to the 
semantics appear to be necessary: 
(1) The domain of individuals may vary across possible worlds. 
(2) The conditional operator may (effectively) * bind variables. 
Example 2 is sufficient to argue for these points, in that, for the assertion that elephants 
like their keepers (4) we want to have that at the least elephant-and-keeper worlds, in 
some fashion, “elephants like their keepers” is true. However, we exclude Fred from 
consideration, since he is an exceptional individual whom elephants do not like. Thus, 
we want to restrict this default to relevant individuals or individuals not known to be 
exceptional, of which Fred is not one. Similarly for elephants not liking Fred (5): we 
implicitly exclude Clyde, who gets along with everyone, including Fred (6). 
Now, an instance of (5) is E&Clyde) A Ke(Fred) + -Likes(Clyde, Fred), and this 
conflicts with (6). So arguably we do not want to allow this instantiation; this is intuitively 
plausible since Clyde is exceptional with respect to (5). Intuitively, in (5) we want x to 
range over nonexceptional individuals, including those elephants that do not like Fred. 
Hence, for the expression of this conditional, we want x, one way or another, to range over 
individuals determined by worlds other than that being modelled: in this case the most 
normal elephant-and-keeper-Fred worlds. 
So for a default such as “birds normally fly”, what we really mean is “at the least 
exceptional worlds in which there are birds, birds fly”. Essentially we look at the least 
worlds in which there are birds, and if all of these birds fly then “birds normally fly” is true. 
At these most normal worlds an individual such as Opus may or may not be in the domain 
of quantification. So for “birds normally fly” we are in fact quantifying over individuals at 
other worlds and, as we concluded above, the domain of quantification may differ at those 
worlds from that at the world at hand. 
8 The qualification is due to the fact that, as subsequently shown, the variable-binding operator can be defined 
away. 
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Informally, “birds normally fly” is true iff: 
At the least worlds in which there are birds: for every x, if x is a bird 
then x flies. 
Syntactically one way to represent his is by: 
(14) 
Bird(x) Jx Fly(x) (15) 
where + now takes a list or tuple of distinct variables, bound in its scope, 9 along with an 
antecedent and consequent constituting the scope of the binding. 
However, assuming that we allow the domain of individuals to vary (in some sense) 
across possible worlds, (14) can be expressed directly, and without recourse to such a 
variable binding operator. If we use 3,-, VC to indicate that we are quantifying over “actual” 
individuals, we can express “birds fly” as follows: 
3,xBird(x) =+ V,x(Bird(x) > Fly(x)). 
That is: at the least worlds in which there are “actual” or “unexceptional” birds, for every 
such individual X, if x is a bird then x flies. This last formula is somewhat cumbersome, 
and ( 15) seems to more naturally express “birds fly”. So in the next subsection I retain ( 15) 
as the official expression of “birds fly”, with +; introduced by definition. 
This gives rise to a small but important consideration regarding language of discourse. 
I envisage a first-order conditional theory being expressed in the language of classical first- 
order logic augmented solely by a variable-binding conditional operator +-z. However, 
in explicating the semantics of this approach, I appeal to a subsuming language, &c, 
that includes the “weak” quantifiers, 3, and VC, as well as a predicate A intended to be 
interpreted as “unexceptional”. The operator =+; can then be introduced by definition by 
reference to these additions. So the role of $, VC, A is to explicate the meaning of +;, 
but there would be no need for these symbols to appear explicitly in the statement of a 
conditional theory. 
4.2. Thejrst-order conditional logic 
Let &C be the language of classical first-order logic, involving denumerable sets of 
variables, constants, and predicates symbols, the truth functional connectives 1 and > 
as well as the binary operator + and a second quantifier symbol V, in addition to the 
usual V. The set of terms is comprised of the set of constants and variables. Formulas are 
constructed as expected, by the usual recursive definition. The connectives A, V, = are 
introduced by definition; 3 is defined as +l and 3, is defined as +Cl. In addition, we 
have a designated unary predicate symbol A whose extension at a world is the domain 
of quantification, as reflected by VC, at that world. Sentences are interpreted in terms of a 
model, a @-model, M = (W, R, D, D’, V) where W, R, and D are as in Section 3.1. D’ 
is a function that assigns a non-empty subset D’(w) of D to each possible world w. V is a 
function on terms, and predicate symbols and worlds, defined as follows: 
(1) For term t, V(t) E D. 
9 In fact, we would have a set of operators, one for each arity. For simplicity I will treat + as a single operator. 
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(2) For n-place predicate symbol P we have V (P, UI) is a set of n-tuples (dl , . . . , d,) 
where each di E D. 
For predicate symbol A we have in addition that V(A, w) = D’(w). 
The intent is that there be a “universal” domain D, consisting of the set of all individuals. 
At each world w there is a nonempty set D’(w) of individuals “existing” or “actual” at w . 
The predicate A is true of just those individuals existing at a world; that is A(t) is true at 
w just if the individual denoted by t is a member of D’(w). So A(t) can be read as “t is 
actual”; in Section 5, I will suggest reinterpreting A(t) as “t is a relevant or unexceptional 
individual”. Terms rigidly designate the same individual across possible worlds. Hence 
Opus denotes the same individual in every possible world, although Opus may or may not 
be actual at any given world. 
Crucially, the quantifier V, will range over the set of individuals D’(w) at world w. 
Intuitively we are concerned with knowledge bases constructed from the language of first- 
order logic together with the variable-binding operator +,-. As indicated previously, the 
formal development is eased considerably if we define +; in terms of our quantifier Vc, 
ranging over “actual” individuals, along with the predicate A. 
Given a model M = (W, R, D, D’, V), truth at a world w is given as follows: 
Definition 4.1. 
(1) M, w + -a, and M, w t= u > ,B, and M, UJ + (Y + /? are defined as in the 
propositional case. 
(2) For n-place predicate symbol P, terms cl,. . , t,,, and w E W, we have M, w + 
P(t1, . . , > td 8 W@l>, . . . , vM> E VW, WI. 
(3) (a) M, w + VX(Y iff for every V’ which is the same as V except possibly V(x) # 
V’(x), and where M’ = (W, R, D, Dt, V’), we have M’, w /= cx. 
(b) M, w k Vcxtr iff for every V’ which is the same as V except V’(x) E D’(w) 
where M’ = (W, R, D, D’, V’), we have M’, w ‘F (11. 
Definitions of satisfiability and validity are the same as in the propositional case. 
For the proof theory, we need to state that the range of the quantifier V, is restricted to 
actual individuals. So for universal instantiation, informally, we need to say that we can 
conclude a(t) from V,xa(x) only when the individual denoted by t is actual. Conversely, 
for universal generalisation, we can conclude that a formula is universally true (in the sense 
of V,) if it is true for all individuals that are actual. This in turn means that at a world we can 
have that V,x(Horse(x) > -Fly(x)> and Horse(Pegasus> A Fly(Pegasus) are true, without 
inconsistency, provided that we also have -A(Pegasus). At this same world we would of 
course have that -Vx(Horse(x) > -Fly(x)) is true. 
The resulting logic is called QS. The axioms of QS consist of all instances of classical 
propositional tautologies, as well as the following schemata, where x is taken as ranging 
over the set of variables. 
ID. a=+-a. 
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Ax. 3xA(x) 
UI. Vxcw(x) 3 a(t) if t is a term free for x in a(x). 
FUI. V,xa(x) > (A(t) > a(t)) if t is a term free for x in o(x). 
CUG. Vx(a! =+ /3) 3 (a + Vx/?) for x not free in (Y. 
The rules of inference are modus ponens, the two previous rules governing the weak 
conditional, and rules for universal generalisation: 
RCEA. From o = o’ infer (a + B) = (cz’ =+ fi). 
RCK. Frorn(B1r\...r\Bn)>Binfer(a~~lr\...r\a!~B,)>a~Bforn30. 
UG. From (Y 3 /? infer IZ > Vx/3 where x is not free in IX. 
FUG. From a! 3 (A(x) 2 p) infer a! 3 V,xfi where x is not free in CY!. 
The axiomatisation clearly subsumes that of S. Ax asserts that there is an actual 
individual. FUI is a weakened version of universal instantiation: if V,xcr(x) is true, then for 
arbitrary term t (with proviso) if t is actual then o(t) is true. Similarly we have an analogue 
for universal generalisation in the rule FUG: if it is the case that #l is true whenever cz is 
and x is actual, then (given the proviso) we can infer a! > V,xg. 
The nonmodal fragment of the system with just the quantifier V clearly corresponds to 
classical first-order logic. We obtain the following theorems and derived rules of inference, 
where x is taken as ranging over the set of variables: 
Theorem 4.1. Let y E {V, V,}. 
(1) a! 3 yxo for x notfree in cz. 
(2) From cx infer yxa. 
(3) kJx(a! > j??) > (a! > kjxj?)for x notfree in f2. 
(4) x((Y > @) > (Yxa > x/v. 
(5) Let c be a constant that does not appear in (Y and x does not occur in (Y or B(c). 
(a) From cz > B(c) infer cx > Vxb(x). 
(b) From a! > (A(c) 3 B(c)) infer a! > V,xj!l(x). 
(6) Vx’xcr > VJ,xo. 
Further results of a more technical interest, involving derived rules of inference 
and nestings of the weak conditional, are found in Section 8 in Definition 8.1 and 
Theorem 8.4. 
The semantic and proof-theoretic characterisations coincide: 
Theorem 4.2. QS is sound and complete with respect to the class of C&S-models. 
We can now introduce the “variable binding” class of operators +; by definition: 
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Definition 4.2. For arbitrary tuple of variables 2: a! =+; /3 %f 3,x’a =+ V$(a > /I). 
The following results are elementary, but show that this definition captures a straightfor- 
ward extension of + from the propositional logic. In particular, it shows that we can not 
make arbitrary sets of defaults satisfiable just by appropriately choosing the extension of 
A at various worlds. 
Theorem 4.3. For any wff (;Y E CFC, define the S-transform S(U) E Cc as follows: 
(1) Replace all occurrences of =$,- by =+-. 
(2) Delete all quantiJiers and terms. 
(3) Replace each distinctpredicate variable by a distinctpropositional variable; replace 
A by T. 
We obtain: ifkes cr then Es S(a). 
The next result gives a partial converse. 
Theorem 4.4. If l-s a! and cz!’ results from c-z by uniformly replacing each propositional 
variable of u by some wff of CFC, and replacing occurrences of =k uniformly by =+; for 
some tuple of distinct variables 2, then k-~s a’. 
For example, since we have 
Es(P+QAP+R)>PAR=%Q, 
then 
k_es (P(x) *x Q(x) A P(x) =s-x R(x)) I f’(x) A R(x) *x Q(x). 
5. Discussion 
5. I. Properties of the formalism 
The intent in the approach is to use the quantifier VC to define the weak variable-binding 
conditional =+;. However, to begin with we can compare VC with V. First, we have the 
theorem Vxtr 3 VCxa. In addition, quantified modal sentences can be expressed with 
various “levels” of force. “Penguins are necessarily birds”, for example, can be expressed 
by: 
V,xn(Penguin(x) I Bird(x)) or Vxn(Penguin(x) > Bird(x)). 
For the first case, we have the reading “every actual penguin is necessarily a bird’. For the 
second case, we have the reading “every penguin (actual or not) is necessarily a bird”. In the 
first case we could consistently conjoin that it is possible that there is a non-bird penguin 
(i.e., O%(Penguin(x) A -Bird(x))); in the second case this would be inconsistent. 
We can consistently state that horses contingently do not have wings but Pegasus is a 
winged horse: 
V,x(Horse(x) 3 -Wings(x)), Horse(Pegasus), Wings(Pegasus). 
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As a logical consequence we obtain -A(Pegasus), that is, Pegasus is not actual. For 
“actuality”, something similar in kind is found in [30], although McCarthy deals with a 
(classical) first-order theory with reified predicates and functions. There, for example, one 
may assert that Pegasus is a horse that does not exist, and further that (existing) horses do 
not have wings but Pegasus does. In the nonmodal fragment of QS, if all individuals were 
actual then the domains of quantification for V and Vc would of course coincide. 
Concerning properties of the conditional logic, we have first that the following sentences 
are jointly consistent: 
Bird(x) JX Fly(x), Bird(OPus), Bird(Opus) +- -FZy(OPus). 
That is, birds normally fly, but Opus is a bird that normally does not fly. In the naive 
approach this of course would be inconsistent. Further, given our birds-fly default, we can 
consistently assert that Opus necessarily does not fly: 
q (Bird(oPUs) A +zy(OPus)). 
This is no problem since at the most normal worlds in which there are (actual) birds, Opus 
may not be actual. On the other hand, we can not consistently assert that birds normally 
fly, but necessarily there is an actual nonflying bird. That is, the following sentences are 
jointly inconsistent: 
Bird(x) =+, Fly(x), q 3&C (Bird(x) A -Fly(x)). 
This is a desirable result, since the first formula states that at the most normal bird worlds, 
birds fly, whereas the second formula states that at every accessible world (including the 
most normal bird worlds) there is an actual nonflying bird. Further, given that we accept 
that normally birds fly, we can not consistently assert that necessarily all birds (actual or 
not) do not fly nor that birds normally do not fly. 
The problems described in Section 2 are satisfactorily resolved. The first example is 
phrased as follows: 
Bird(x) Jx Fly(x), 
Penguin(x) +X -Fly(x), 
VxO(Penguin(x) > Bird(x)). (lo) 
These sentences are jointly consistent, and have Bird(x) +, -Penguin(x) as a logical con- 
sequence. However, given just these sentences, we cannot conclude that Penguin(Opus) =+ 
-FZy(Opus) is true, as we could in the naive approach. Thus, in contrast with the earlier 
approach, we do not have the result that at the least worlds where Penguin(Opus) is true, 
-FZy(Opus) is true. What we do have is that at the least worlds in which there are pen- 
guins, penguins do not fly; Opus may or may not be among the individuals existing at such 
worlds. Now, it seems quite reasonable that we might want to conclude that Opus is an 
actual (or: unexceptional) penguin at such worlds, and so does not fly. However, such an 
assumption of unexceptional@ is a nonmonotonic assumption, outside the present frame- 
work. I return to this theme briefly in Section 5.2, where I outline how such an assumption 
can be effected. 
The second example involves “specificity” arising from the nesting of quantifiers. This 
example would now be expressed as follows: 
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(E&x) A My)) =hy Like+, Y>, 
(El(x) A Ke(Fred)) +, -Like&, Fred), 
(EZ(CZyde) A Ke(Fred)) + Likes(CZyde, Fred). 
Given that EZ(CZyde) A Ke(Fred) is contingently true at a world w, the above sentences are 
now simultaneously satisfiable. At the least exceptional El(x) A Kc(y) worlds, Fred would 
not be actual; at these worlds all elephants would indeed like their keepers. Among the 
least exceptional 3,(EZ(x) A Ke(Fred)) worlds we would have that elephants do not like 
Fred, as desired. If instead we wished to assert that elephants normally like their keepers, 
but there is some keeper that is not normally liked by elephants, we could represent his as 
follows: 
(El(x) A Kc(y)) +,, Likes(x, y), 3y((EZ(x) A Kc(y)) =+-, -Like+, y)). 
The third example deals with finite and infinite versions of the lottery paradox. While 
the lottery paradox seems largely bound with notions of default inference, and the present 
paper deals with representational issues, nonetheless we can still say something about the 
lottery paradox in the present framework. In the finite case, knowledge about bird species 
may be expressed either by (8) or (9). In (8), for a given world w, a bird is contingently one 
of some number of species. At other worlds such an individual need not be of that species, 
nor even a bird at all. Arguably such a notion is overly weak. As discussed further below, 
we well might want to say that if an individual is a bird then it is necessarily a bird. Hence 
we would adopt (9), and assert that a bird is necessarily one of some number of species. In 
the present framework this presents no difficulty: we can consistently assert, for example, 
that, along with the usual bird properties, every species is exceptional in some fashion, and 
that every individual that is a bird is (necessarily) of one of these species, and, perhaps, is 
necessarily a bird. 
The “standard” (infinite) version of the lottery paradox is different. While V,x(T + 
-Winner(x)) no longer entails T +- ‘4,x-Winner(x), both formulations (11) and (12) are 
still unsatisfiable. However, this is as things should be: what this shows is not that the 
present approach is inadequate, but rather that the standard lottery paradox is not plausibly 
represented using notions of “normality” that are not probabilistically based. In stating 
that “normally one does not win the lottery”, the sense of “normal” is that of statistical 
likelihood. However, in the approach at hand, the notion of “normally” bears only a tenuous 
relation with statistical notions. 
To further argue this last point, take a relatively extreme case: we may have a conditional 
cz +, B where in the domain being modelled a!(t) A p(t) is true of no individual. Is it 
reasonable to allow this situation? The answer is “yes”, as two examples (from [41,42]) 
illustrate. Consider first the statement “lemons are yellow”, Lemon(x) j, YeZZow(x). It is 
not inconceivable that some new disease may come along, in which al2 lemons are affected. 
If this disease turns lemons blue, say, then we would still hold Lemon(x) =+, Yellow(x) 
even though we contingently would have that Vx(Lemon(x) > -YeZZow(x)). In this case, 
it would make perfect sense to say that lemons are normally yellow even though presently 
none are, due to the presence of the disease. The second example is from physics (and 
assumes for sake of argument a Newtonian universe). We know that “planets move in 
ellipses” is true. The only difficulty is that, in point of fact, no planet ever has, nor ever will, 
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move in an ellipse: the gravitational pull of other planets, moons, stars, etc. ensures that 
such idealised motion would not occur. Nonetheless, one still holds to the assertion that, 
in ideal circumstances (i.e., factoring out exceptional conditions), a planet would indeed 
move in an ellipse. 
So essentially the notion of “normally” formalised here corresponds to that found 
in (naive, commonsense) scientific theories; and a conditional c~ +X fi corresponds to 
a law in such a theory. This stance further justifies the lack of “full” instantiation for 
general defaults. Given that one accepts “lemons are normally yellow”, it seems clear that 
“individual I, which is a lemon, is normally yellow” should not be a logical consequence. 
On the other hand, this last assertion is a reasonable nonmonotonic instantiation. In the 
next subsection I briefly consider how such an assumption can be effected. 
5.2. Minimizing exceptions 
Consider an earlier example, that birds normally fly but Opus does not: 
Bird(x) ==+-x Fly(x), Bird(Opus) + -Fly(Opus). 
A logical consequence is that Opus is not actual at the most normal bird worlds: 
Bird(x) +, -A(Opus) or equally 3,xBird(x) + -A(Opus). 
Now, the predicate A is simply a predicate with a particular fixed semantic interpretation, 
and we are free to informally interpret it as we wish. Instead of “exists” or “actual”, an 
alternative reading for A is as “reIevant” or “unexceptional”. Which is to say, a(x) =+-, 
/3(x) is true just when in the least 3cx~ worlds, for every actual individual, if a! is true of 
that individual then so is j5l. But this is perhaps better read as saying that this is true for 
every “relevant” or “unexceptional” individual at such worlds. Thus the predicate A can be 
taken as denoting such relevant (or unexceptional) individuals. 
If we are given only the assertion Bird(x) =+, Fly(x) then, lacking information to the 
contrary, it seems that we should be able to conclude Bird(Opus) =+ Fly(Opus). That is, 
lacking information to the contrary, we would want to assume that an individual (here 
Opus) is unexceptional wherever possible. This can be carried out straightforwardly in 
terms of preference among models. Let Pl , . . . , P,, be a tuple of predicate symbols, denoted 
by P. The intent is to choose those models with maximal D’, where the extension of the 
predicates in + is allowed to vary. 
Assume that 7 is a consistent theory of CFC, and let MI = (W, R, D, Di, VI) and 
M2 = (W, R, D, Dk, V2) be two models of 7. 
Write Mt <i; M2 if 
(1) VI(t) = V2(t) for every term t. 
(2) V1 (Q, w) = V2( Q, w) for predicate symbol Q different from A and not in F, and 
for every world 20. 
(3) D;(w) 2 D;(w) for every world w. 
The <F-minimal models of 7 are those models with maximal D’, or maximal sets of 
actual (or unexceptional)individuals. We can write 7 b.~? o just when every <;-minimal 
model of 7 is also a model of a. Clearly in our motivatmg example we now obtain 
(Bird(x) =+X Fly(x)} I=+ Bird(Opus) =?- FZy(Opus). 
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Essentially we assume that A holds of as many individuals as consistently possible. 
Maximising the extension of A at a world is the same as minimising -A; if we read A(t) 
as “f is unexceptional” then -A(t) of course is “t is exceptional”. So our minimisation of 
abnormalities looks very much like variable circumscription [32], but in a modal context. 
Presumably, the minimization policy would be such that the predicate symbols in ? are 
chosen from among the predicates appearing in the consequents of a weak conditional. 
Note though that there are differences with variable circumscription. In variable 
circumscription, there are various “Ab” predicates corresponding to conditions with 
respect to which an individual may be exceptional. In contrast we minimize just one 
predicate, A, corresponding to the set of “unexceptional” individuals at a world. In 
addition, an individual is exceptional or not with respect to each world. The minimization 
here is intended solely to provide a means of allowing instantiation “by default” for a 
general weak conditional. This minimization is clearly orthogonal to others, such as that 
employed in the rational closure of a theory [28], where the minimization is essentially 
carried out on the rank of worlds. Consequently, other issues concerning nonmonotonic 
reasoning with weak conditionals, such as dealing with irrelevant properties, are not 
addressed here. Presumably such issues may be handled as in the propositional case using, 
for example, schemes analogous to those such as rational closure. 
6. Comparison with related work 
As a quantificational modal logic, the present approach notably has world-relative 
domains and rigidly designating terms. The notion of nonexisting terms has been discussed 
in Artificial Intelligence in for example [30]; as well there are echoes of free logic [49] in 
the nonmodal fragment of the system. Hirst [2 l] discusses issues concerning existence and 
nonexistence of individuals in Artificial Intelligence that pertain to choices made here. With 
respect to conditional logics and default reasoning, there are three approaches in Artificial 
Intelligence that may be compared with the present. 
Kraus et al. [22] and Lehmann and Magidor [29] investigate (propositional) non- 
monotonic consequence operators. An operator k is specified such that c~ k j3 has the 
intended reading that if a! is true then B nonmonotonically (or normally or plausibly) fol- 
lows as a consequence. Relations among these operators are given using Gentzen-style 
rules. Notably the symbol k is not an element in the language, but represents a conditional 
assertion between formulas. So analogous to the axiom ASC is the relation of Cautious 
Monotony: 
at---B, at-v 
There are analogous rules corresponding to the axioms and rules of conditional logics. The 
system P OfpreferentiaE entailment corresponds to the system S. lo In 1281 an extension to 
the first-order case is given; the following rules are proposed: 
(17) 
lo See [8] for connections between conditional logics and nonmonotonic consequence operators. 
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3m i--B 
~ 
at-B 
(x not free in p). (18) 
One representation of (17) in the present approach is 
From 01=+ B infer $~a! j 3,x/3. 
This indeed is a derived rule in QS, but it is not particularly interesting, if only because 
theorems of the form a! * #I are not interesting. The alternative representation: 
is not a theorem in the present approach, since the truth values of the two conditionals 
may be determined with respect to differing worlds (i.e., there is no connection between 
the least 01(x) worlds and the least 3,xc_x(x) worlds). The following formula, which is of 
similar form and arguably captures the intent of (17), is valid in QS: 
a 3X /!l > 3cxff =+ 3,xB. 
Thus, for example, if birds normally fly, then in the least worlds in which there is a bird, 
some individual flies. As well, 
cr*/?X3,x(a*/l) forxnotfreeinc-w,B 
is valid in our approach. This last formula is not expressible using nonmonotonic 
consequence operators, since 3x((r k /?) is not a well-formed syntactic object. 
For (18) there are two natural representations as rules of inference, depending on how 
we take the scope of the quantifier: 
From3,x(a!+B)infera,+p, 
From (3,xol) + j!? infer a + fi for x not free in CX, @. 
Both are derived rules in QS; only the second has a meaningful representation using 
nonmonotonic consequence operators. For the analogous formulas, 3,x (a + /?) > a! + /3 
(for x not free in cz!, B) is valid, while (3,x(r) =+ B > a, =+ B is not. A representation 
arguably closer to the intent of Lehmann and Magidor [28], and valid in QS, is the 
following: 
(3,x(r) * /3 1 a! j, p for x not free in /3. 
Finally Lehmann and Magidor [28] reject the following rule: 
From a(x) =+ B(x) infer o(t) =+ B(t) (19) 
where t is free for x in (Y(X). The reasons given are essentially those that we gave for the 
elephant-keeper example in (4)-(6) in the naive approach: that unrestricted substitution 
leads to inconsistency in “reasonable” situations. In QS, using FUI and RCK, we obtain 
the theorem (assuming t is free for x), expressing an acceptable version of (19): 
[o(x) =+x B(x)1 3 [3cxo(x) =+ ((A(t) A o(r)) 1 B(t))l. (20) 
Thus, for example, if birds normally fly, then at the least bird worlds, if Opus is actual (i.e., 
unexceptional) and a bird then Opus flies. One might want to assume that Opus is in fact 
unexceptional, a nonmonotonic assumption described in the previous section. 
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&S allows more distinctions than [28], and is more broadly applicable to a wider range 
of situations. It is unclear how the conditional (Y =+z /3 would be translated into a system 
of nonmonotonic consequence operators (since in the obvious translation the image of 
=$; would bind variables across the k operator, yielding an ill-formed expression); most 
likely one would need to use the more cumbersome expression given in Definition 4.2. 
However &S is a logic of first-order conditionals, and so does not address notions of 
nonmonotonicity; the natural next step of course is to investigate nonmonotonic reasoning 
in this framework. Nonmonotonic reasoning is something that Lehmann and Magidor [28] 
address, where it is conjectured that a finite first-order knowledge base as given therein has 
a rational closure. 
Schlechta [44] formalises a notion of “normally CX(X)” using restricted quantification. 
Vxa(x) is true if a! holds on an “important” subset of the domain. If D is the domain 
of individuals, then N(D) consists of a family of important subsets of D such that the 
intersection of any two elements of this family is nonempty. The nonempty intersection 
condition rules out a default and its negation both being true. Vxa(x) is true just if there is 
a member D’ of N( D) for which a! is true for every element of D’. Our a! =+; /I would be 
expressed VXCZ(X) : /3(x), with the interpretation that all x’s that satisfy a! normally satisfy 
#I. In the resultant logic, relations among quantifiers include 
VXCX(X) 1 -V-XX(X) as well as Vx’xa > Vxcr(x) and VXCZ > %w(x). 
The notion of “normally” then corresponds roughly to that of “actual” or “unexceptional” 
in QS, and Schlechta’s V corresponds roughly to our V,, although it is in some respects 
weaker. (For example, Vx (o > p) > (Vxa > Vx/I)-our Theorem 4.1(4)-is not valid 
in Schlechta’s approach, although Vx(a! > B) > (Vxo > Vx#?) is.) Assuming such a 
correspondence, in &S there is only one “important” set per world, as opposed to multiple 
sets in Schlechta’s approach; however this set varies from world to world. Possible worlds 
are not used in Schlechta’s approach, and so notions of normalcy, defined in terms of 
preferences among worlds, are not available. On the other hand, Schlechta is concerned 
with interpreting defaults in the sense given, say, in [43], where, arguably such notions of 
preference are not relevant in the semantics. 
In [45] this approach is joined with a second “inference-greedy” step wherein as many 
instances of the defaults are made true as possible. This is accomplished by defining a 
preference relation on the models of a default theory, where roughly M is preferred to M’ 
if M satisfies all positive instances of the defaults that M’ does, and for no default is there a 
negative instance which holds in M but not in M’, and moreover there is some default with 
a positive instance in M which is not positive in M’. This step then is analogous in intent to 
that outlined in Section 5.2. However whereas Schlechta compares models (corresponding 
to our possible worlds) by considering the positive and negative instances of all defaults, 
I maximize solely on the predicate A, but across all possible worlds, in comparing models. 
In the present approach I retain a notion of specificity intrinsic in the ordering on possible 
worlds whereas Schlechta does not. Hence, using the definition given in (1) for default 
inference, in Example 1 we would obtain only that a penguin flies while this would not be 
the case in [45]. 
Lastly, Friedman et al. [ 131 develop a first-order conditional logic based on phusibili~ 
measures. A plausibility measure is a function that associates a notion of plausibility (a 
126 J.F! Delgrande /Artificial Intelligence 105 (1998) 105-137 
member in some partially ordered set) with a set of possible worlds. For sets of worlds A 
and B, P&A) 6 H(B) means that A is no more plausible than B. It is stipulated that: 
Al. If A _C B then PI(A) < PI(B). 
Two further conditions are required to obtain the properties of system S. From 
this, a first-order logic is defined. As with QS, the approach is intended to deal with 
representational issues, and does not address issues of nonmonotonic inference. However 
there are notable differences between the approaches. 
First, Friedman et al. [ 131 are generally guided by intuitions deriving from statistics and 
direct inference. So “birds typically fly” is foremost for them a statistical statement. As a 
consequence, a specific concern is to be able to adequately address the lottery paradox. In 
contrast, in QS the central concern is to address first-order issues in conditional logics in 
general. I have used examples concerning defaults throughout this paper, but need not 
have done so; rather, the approach is generally applicable to subjunctive conditionals, 
and so applies to counterfactual statements, hypotheticals, etc. Note too that the lemons- 
are-yellow and planets-move-in-ellipses examples of Section 5.1 illustrate that, from a 
representational point of view, a statistical approach is not appropriate for these notions 
of normality. Thus the approaches are intended for different applications. 
Insofar as technical differences are concerned, Friedman et al. [i3] make primary use 
of nonrigid designators, so a term can denote different individuals in different worlds. But 
(see Section 2) this seems curious, in that if we are talking about Opus’ (likely) flying 
ability, and this notion depends on other possible worlds, then it seems that the term Opus 
should pick out the same individual across possible worlds. ” So for our elephant/keeper 
example in (4)-(6), in [ 131 consistency can be maintained only by having Clyde and Fred 
designate different individuals at different worlds. 
This has further ramifications, in that where we have FUI, Friedman et al. [ 131 have: 
Fl. Vxa(x) > a(t) 
where t is a term free for x in a(x), and if cr is a formula that has occurrences of + then 
the only terms substitutable for x in a are other variables. 
In contrast we have limited substitution; for example, in (20), we have substitution into 
a modal context. We also have as an instance of FUI that for constant c: 
Vcx(Mx> =+-B(x)) ZJ (A(c) 2 (a(c) =+ B(c))> 
which provides an example of, in contradistinction to [ 131, substitution of a constant into 
a modal context. 
7. Conclusion 
This paper has addressed issues in first-order conditional logics, and has developed 
a general framework within which to address quantificational concerns in conditiona 
” Rigid terms may in fact be incorporated in [13]; the point is that the truth of weak conditionals in their 
approach is based on nonrigid terms. 
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logics. The approach applies generally to conditional logics intended to represent defaults, 
counterfactuals, and other subjunctive conditionals. Interestingly, the classic treatment 
of counterfactuals, and arguably conditional logics in general [27], begins with the 
(counterfactual) example “if kangaroos had no tails, they would topple over”. This 
statement is clearly and easily representable in the first-order analogue to Lewis’ “official” 
counterfactual ogic VC by means of the present approach. And equally clearly we could 
allow for a particularly coordinated individual Happy where it is true that “if Hoppy had 
no tail then he would not topple over”. 
The approach is most notably characterised by its adopting world-relative domains. 
As well, default (and other subjunctive) assertions are expressed by means of a variable- 
binding conditional. This “variable-binding” conditional is in turn defined in terms of the 
“standard’ weak conditional =+, as well as with a “weak” quantifier V,, and a designated 
predicate A that picks out actual or unexceptional individuals at each world. The approach 
does not incorporate all of the formal machinery that it might in order to highlight relevant 
issues and to make the presentation clear. The introduction of functions, equality, and 
nonrigid terms would present little difficulty. 
The focus in this paper is on addressing representational issues; clearly the major topic 
for future work is to address default inference in a first-order setting. One obvious strategy 
would be to extend the present approach by effectively welding on the machinery of 
some extant approach. The difficulty with such a strategy is that no current approach 
is as yet unproblematic. That being said, probably the easiest approach to incorporate 
with the present framework would be (an analogue of) rational closure [29]. The central 
intuition in rational closure is that one assumes that worlds (or their equivalents) are as 
normal as possible; so one attempts to minimise worlds in a ranking, based on an initial 
set of defaults. Very roughly, one can conclude that a green bird flies because there is 
nothing blocking the assumption that green-bird worlds are among the most normal bird 
worlds. 
In the present framework there is also a second minimisation, described in Section 5.2, 
where we assume that individuals at a worlds are unexceptional, whenever possible. This 
allows the conclusion that Opus normally flies, given that birds fly along with the fact 
that we have no reason to believe that Opus is not exceptional. This is effected via an 
assumption that A holds of as many individuals as consistently possible. 
8. Proofs of theorems 
F will mean l-&s throughout Section 8. 
Proof of Theorem 4.1. I just give proofs for V,; V follows in each case analogously. 
(1) F o > (A(x) > a) is an instance of a propositional tautology. We can choose 
variable x so that it does not occur in (Y. FUG gives I- CY 3 V,na. 
(2) Given I- CX, from propositional logic we obtain t- A(x) > ct. Applying FUG gives 
E V,xa. 
(3) An instance of FUI is F VC’cx(a > B) > (A(x) > (a > fi(x))). By propositional 
logic, F (a! A VC’cx(a! 1 /I)) 1 (A(x) 3 B(x)) and by FUG t- (a A V,x(a 1 B)) 3 
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V,x/l(x), where x is not free in (Y. Rearranging terms we obtain E V,x(ar 3 fi) > 
(a 1 V&I). 
(4) Two combined instances of FUI give E (VCcx(a! > /I) A VC’cno) > (A(x) > ((a(x) > 
p(x)) A a!(x))) from which by propositional logic we obtain I- (VCx(~ > /I) A 
V,xcr) > (A(x) > p(x)). An application of FUG and a rearranging of terms yields 
the result. 
(5) Let @u, . . . , en be a proof of a 3 (A(c) > B(c)) where variable x does not appear 
in the proof. (This can always be obtained by uniformly renaming variables.) For 
each $i, 0 < i 6 n, we obtain the formula $I by uniformly substituting variable 
x for constant c. It is straightforward to argue that +A, . . . , +A is a proof of 
o > (A(x) > /3(x)): if @i is an axiom then SO is +:. If +i results from @j and 
+j > $i by modus ponens then ti; results from $rj and @: > @f by modus ponens. 
Similar remarks apply to the other rules of inference. Since x does not appear in o!, 
an application of FUG to &!, for variable n yields (Y > Vex/?(x). 
(6) E Vxa > a(x) via UI. Hence t- Vxa > (A(x) > 01(x)) by propositional logic; hence 
I- VXOI > V’,XU by FUG. q 
Proof of Theorem 4.3. The proof follows by induction on a proof of cx in QS. The image 
of every axiom of QS is valid in S, and the image of the rules of inference are easily seen 
to preserve validity. We obtain by induction that S(U) is valid in S, hence ks S(o). q 
Proof of Theorem 4.4. The proof follows by a straightforward induction on a proof in the 
propositional logic: the image of propositional axioms under the replacement are theorems, 
and the rules RCEA and RCEC and modus ponens preserve theoremhood. q 
Theorem 8.1 (Bound alphabetic variants). Cull (Y(X) and a(y) similar ifx isfree in a(x) 
precisely where y is free in (Y(Y). Zf a(x) and (Y(Y) are similar then 
(1) t- Vxa(x) E VycX(y); 
(2) t- V~Xrn(X) = V,ya(y). 
Proof. Both results are straightforward; for the second, by FUI, k Vc.xcr(_x) > (A(y) > 
a(y)) since y is free for x in 01(x). Rearranging terms we obtain I- A(y) r) (Vcxa(x) I 
a(y)) and from FUG we get FV,y(V,xa(x) > a(y)). By Theorem 4.1(3) we get 
+ V,xa(x) > VCycz(y). The same argument gives t VCyc.r(y) > VC’cx~(x), from which we 
obtain the equivalence. q 
Theorem 8.2 (Soundness of QS). Zj’k CY then /= CL 
Proof. Soundness is proved in the general case by an inductive argument on the length of 
a proof. The only interesting cases are CUG, FUI and FUG. 
(CUG) Assume that in M = (W, R, D, D’, V) we have M, w b Vx(o1 =+ /?) where x is 
not free in cz. Now M, w + Vx(a + j3) iff for every V’ like V, except possibly V(n) # 
V’(x), and where M’ = (W, R, D, D’, V’), we have M’, w k u j fi. By definition 
M’, w + a! + B iff for every wr E min(w, Ilall”‘) we have wl E II/311”‘. Since x is not 
free in a, cz must have the same value at wr in M’ as it does in M. So for every V’ the same 
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as V, except possibly V(x) # V’(x), we have WI E II/311”‘, or by the definition of V for V, 
we have ~1 E IIV’n/?II”. That is, for every WI E min(w, IIc~ll~) we have ~1 E IIV.+?II”, So 
M,w~o*V@. 
(FIJI) Assume that in M = (W, R, D, D’, V) we have M, w + V,xcr(x). So for every 
V’ the same as V except that V’(x) E D’(w) where M’ = (W, R, D, D’, V’) we have 
M’, w + a(x). Assume that V assigns to t some member of D’(w) at w. Then among the 
various V’ there must be one that assigns to x the same member of D’(w) as V assigns to 
t at w. So for this V’ we have V’(x) = V(t). Since, V(t) E D’(w) we have M, w b A(t). 
Since M’, w + a(x) and V’(x) = V(t), so M, w + a(t), whence M, w b A(t) I a(t). 
Alternatively, assume that V assigns to t some member of D not in D’(w). Since 
V(t) 4 D’(w) then M, w F A(t), so M, w + -A(t), so M, w + A(t) > a(t). 
(FUG) Assume that M, w + (Y for model M and world w (otherwise M, w t= -a, 
and so M, w + a 3 V,xg). Since a! 1 (A(x) > p) is valid by assumption, so M, w t= 
A(x) > #?. For any model M’ = (W, R, D, D’, V’) which is the same as M, except V’ 
assigns x to a member of D’(w), we have M’, w + A(x) > /3 (since x does not occur 
in a! and so M’, w k Q, hence the result by modus ponens). So for every such V’ we 
have M’, w b A(x) > B. Since V’ assigns x to a member of D’(w), so M’, w b A(x) 
and so (via modus ponens) we obtain M’, w b /?. But by the definition of + this means 
M, w + ‘+,x/3. So for any model and any world in which M, w /= a! where x is not free in 
a! we have M, w k V&3, whence M, w + a! > V,x#l for every model and world, assuming 
xisnotfreeincr. 0 
The following results are straightforward but tedious. Where no confusion arises, I have 
on occasion combined steps in a proof. 
Theorem 8.3. 
(1) cso: ((a =j B> A (B =+ aI> 1 ((a =+ v> = (B * VI>. 
(2) ((a =+ v> A (B =+ 6)) 3 (a ” B> ==+ (v ” 0 
(3) (((2 ” B =+ a> A (B ” Y =+ B)> 3 a ” Y * ff. 
Proof. 
(1) [9, B31. 
(2) (1) ol*y>cll=kyvs Theorem, from RCK; 
(2) /!l*&>B*yvS Theorem, from RCK; 
(3) (cr=kyAB*s)>a!v/!l=+yv6 (l), (2), CA, PC. 
(3) (1) ((a’ ” B’ =+ a’) A (a’ =+ cd V B’)) 3 ((cd =+ y’) = (a’ V j?’ =+ y’)) cso; 
(2) cd V j?’ =+ cd 3 ((a’ =+ y’) 3 (cd V B’ * y’)) (l), Theorem: u =+- a! v /I, PC; 
(3) t~o1”B”Y~~“B~A\((lLvB~~~>>(a)vBvy~ol) Instance of 2; 
(4) ((~“VB~)A(~~“Y~B))>~!“B”Y~~!“B Theorem 8.3.2; 
(5) ((a ” B =+ o) A (B ” Y =+ /I)) 1 
(ovB”r*o) (4), (3), Transitivity of 3, PC; 
(6) ((a!“B”v~ar”y>A(ar”B”v~a)>>cr”yja! ASC; 
(7) (a”~“v~cr>>(a!v~v~~a!vy) Theorem, from RCK; 
(8) (avB”v=+a)>avy=+a! (o), (7), PC: 
(9) ((a”B~cr)A(B”YjB))>a”v=>cu (W, (S), PC. •I 
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The completeness proof is a bit awkward since we have two quantifiers to deal with. 
V is handled basically as in [ 11,201; V, is handled in an extension of the technique given 
therein. In particular, where [20] make use of the V-property, I define a related notion called 
here the V,-property. For the proof we need to show (see Lemma 8.3) that a set of formulas 
satisfying certain conditions can be extended to a maximal consistent set satisfying both 
the V-property and the V,-property. 
Definition 8.1. An Z-form is a formula having the following shape: 
(1) A formula of the nonmodal first-order logic is an Z-form. 
(2) If B is an Z-form according to steps (1) and (2) only then cx + /3 is an Z-form. 
(3) If /? is an Z-form then M > @ is an Z-form. 
So an Z-form has shape QO > (al =+ . . . + (a, =+ j3). . .) where n > 0. Since (;LO may be 
a theorem this means that informally any of the >, + may be missing. An Z-form where 
fi is the “innermost” formula, as given in step (1) of Definition 8.1, will be denoted Z(B). 
For a given Z-form Z(B), Z(y) will denote the Z-form obtained by replacing j3 by y. 
The following theorem generalizes RCK, CUG, FUI and FUG. 
Theorem 8.4. Let Z-fom Z(B) be q 3 (al j . . . e (ati + j?) . . .). 
(1) rfl_B > y then ET(p) XT(y). 
(2) t- VxZ(B) 3 Z(Vxj3)for x notfree in ai, 0 < i < n. 
(3) k- Z(V,X,LT(X)) > Z(A(t) > B(t>>for t freefor x in B. 
(4) From I- Z(A(x) > 6) infer k Z(V,xB)for x notfree iiz (pi, 0 < i 6 n. 
Proof. 
(1) If t- B > y then RCK yields E (an =+ j?) 1 (a, =+ y). Kepeated application 
of RCK gives k (oil =+ . . . =+ (an =+ j3). . .) > (a1 + . . . ==k- (a, =+ y> . . .). By 
classical logic we get t- (a0 > (at * . . . 3 (a, * /I). . .)) 3 (~20 3 (al + . . . =+ 
(%I =+ Y) ‘. .)). 
(2) Assume that x is not free in the various ai’s. Proof is by induction on the 
depth of nesting of + in the construction of an Z-form with CUG providing 
the base case. For the general case, an instance of CUG gives Vx(at =+ . . + 
(an =+ 6). . .) 3 a1 * (Vxa2 * . . . =+ (a, =+ /3) . . .>. By the induction hypoth- 
esis, k (Vxcq =+ . . . =+ (af2 * B) . . .> 3 (at +- . . . + (ai, + Vxj3). . _). An applica- 
tion of RCK yields !- ((~1 + (VXCQ =+ . . . + (a, + /I) .. .)) 3 (al + (012 =k 
. . 3 (a, =+ VxJxB) . . .>) from which we conclude(Vx(acl =+ . . . ==s (a, j /J) . . .)) II 
(al =+ . . =+ (a, +F ‘ix/l). .)) and so by classical logic (Vxcuo 1 (al =+ . .. =+ 
(a, =+ B) . . .)> 3 ((Yo 3 (at =+ . . . =+ (&I =+ Vx/T) . . .)). 
(3) FUI is t- V,xg(x) > (A(t) > /3(t)) for t free for x in B. The result follows from 
Theorem 8.4.1. 
(4) From E T(A(x) > /cl) we infer E VxZ(A(x) 2 j3) via Theorem 4.1(2) and E 
Z(Vx(A(x) > B)) via Theorem 8.4(2) (assuming that x is not free in the various 
CZ~ ‘s). From Theorem 4.1(6) we have I- Va$ 1 V,x/? from which we obtain k 
Vx(A(x) 1 B) > V,xg. Theorem 8.4(l) gives t- Z(Vx(A(x) 2 B)) 1 Z(V,xg) and 
since we have E Z(Vx(A (x) > @)) we obtain E Z(V,xj?) q 
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Definition 8.2. 
(1) A set of wffs A has the V-property iff for every formula cz and variable x, 
if A k o(t) for every term t then A l- Vxlxa(x). 
(2) A set of wffs A has the VC-property iff for every formula o and variable x, 
if A I- Z(A(t) > a(t)) for every term t then A k Z(Vcxa(x)). 
(3) A set of wffs with both the V-property and the Vc-property will be said to have the 
V,V,-property. 
Lemma 8.1. 
(1) 0 has the V-property. 
(2) 0 has the V,-property. 
Proof. I just prove the second part; the first part is a simplification of this case. Assume 
that t- Z(A(t) > /I(t)) for every term t. If Z(A(t) II t!?(t)) is ou 1 (ot j . . . j (a, =+ 
(A(t) > B(t))) . . .) then we have E Z(A(t) > /f?(t)) for t a variable not appearing in oi, 
0 < i < n. From Theorem 8.4(4) we obtain l- Z(V,xB(x)). That the general result obtains 
for every variable follows by Theorem 8.1 and Theorem 8.4( 1). •I 
Lemma 8.2. 
(1) If A has the V-property then A U {/?} has the V-property. 
(2) If A has the V,-property then A U (fi} has the V,-property. 
Proof. 
(1) Assume that A has the V-property and that A U {/I) t- a(t) for every term t. So A F 
p > a(t). Since A has the V-property we obtain A t- Vx(j3 > o(x)) for any variable 
x. We can choose x so that it does not occur in ,f3; hence (via Theorem 4.1(3)) 
A I- B 3 Vxo(x), so A U I/t?) k Vxo(x) and A U {B} has the V-property. 
(2) Assume that A has the Vc-property and that A U (/3} k Z(A(t) > a(t)) for every 
term t. So A t- j3 3 Z(A(t) 3 a(t)). So by propositional logic ,9 1 Z(A(t) II a(t)) 
is an Z-form and since A has the V,-property we obtain A F /? > Z(V,xo(x)). 
Consequently A U {/?) k 2T(V,xa(x)) and A U {B) has the V,-property. q 
Lemma 8.3. Assume that A has the V,V,-property and j3 is a wff such that A U (/I} is 
consistent. Then there exists a maximal consistent set I’ of wffs such that A U (/I) 2 r and 
r has the V,V,-property. 
Proof. Suppose that the wffs of .&C are arranged in some determinate order 61,82, . . , as 
are the terms. Define a sequence of wffs yu, yt, , . . , by: 
(1) YO is A U MI. 
(2) (a) If 6i is -Vxo(x) and if vi U (-Vxa(x)) is consistent then 
Yi+l = Yi u (-vXCf(x>I U {-a(t>I 
for some term t that leaves yi+l consistent. 
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Such a term is guaranteed to exist: we have that yi U (-VXCY(X)) is consistent. If 
vi U {-Vxa(x)} U {-a(t)} were inconsistent for every term t then we would have 
vi U (-Vxa(x)) I- a(t) for every t. But yi U {-Vxa(x)) is of the form A U @ 
for finite q. Since A has the V-property, so by Lemma 8.2( 1) and propositional 
logic does A U ‘P, or vi U (1Vxcx(x)). But this means that if yi U (1Vxo(x)} t 
a(t) for every t then yi U (+xa(x)} k VX(Y(X); so K U (-Vxa(x)] is inconsis- 
tent, contradiction. So there is always a term t that leaves yi+t consistent. 
(b) Otherwise if 6i is -Z(V,xo(x)) and if yi U (-ZT(V,xa(n))) is consistent then 
~i+i = Yi U (-x(V=xo(x))J U (1x(A(r) 1 o(t))) 
for some term t that leaves yi+i consistent. 
Such a term is guaranteed to exist: we have that yi U ( --Z(Vcxa(n))) is consis- 
tent. If vi U (-Z(V,xcu(x))} U (-Z(A(t) > a!(t))} were inconsistent for every 
term t then we would have yi U (-~(V,xa(x))} F Z(A(t) > a(t)) for every 
t. But yi U (-Z(V,xcz(x))] is of the form A U @ for finite ly. Since A has 
the V,-property, so by Lemma 8.2(2) does A U P, or yi U (-2(V,xa(x))}. 
But this means that if yi U (-Z(V,xa(x))) F Z(A(t) > a(t)) for every t then 
yi U (-1(V,xa(x))} t- Z(VCxczl(x)); SO yi U (-Z(V,xa(x))} is inconsistent, con- 
tradiction. So there is always a term t that leaves yi+t consistent. 
(c) Otherwise if 6i is not of the form -Vxa!(x) or -Z(V,XCX(X)) and yi U (Si) is 
consistent, then vi+] = yi U (Si). 
(d) Otherwise M+l = yi. 
So our sequence ya, ~1, . . . is well-defined. 
Let r = ur”=,(A U n), f is consistent (otherwise there is some k such that A U yk 
is inconsistent, contradiction), maximal, and (via an induction using Lemma 8.2) has the 
V,V,-property. 0 
Definition 8.3. For r G &c, r-(a) = (v ) a +- y E r). 
Lemma 8.4. rfr is a consistent set offormulas containing ~(a * /3) then r- (a) U (+) 
is consistent. 
Proof. Assume r-(a) U (-/?I is inconsistent. So there exists a finite subset (~1, . . . , yn) 
of r-(o) where (~1,. . . , yn} I- /? or k (A;=, vi) > B. From RCK we obtain k (a =+ 
yl)r\-.-r\(a!jyn)>(zlj.Now{crjyl,..., cz j yn} G r hence r k cz + ,6. But 
-((Y + /I) E r so r is inconsistent, contradiction. q 
Lemma 8.5. 
(1) If r is a maximal consistent set offormulas with the V-property then r-(a) has the 
V-property. 
(2) If r is a maximal consistent set offormulas with the VC-property then r-(a) has 
the V,-property. 
Proof. 
(1) Assume that r-(a) k y(t) for every term t. Then, for every term t there are 
y~,...,~n~r-(~)suchthatt-(~~~...~~n)~~(t).S~~(~~~l~...~~~ 
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yn) > cx =+ v(t) by RCK. But a! =+ yt, . . . , (Y + yn E r, since each yi E r-(a). 
So, LY =+ y(t) E r, or r !- Q! + y(t) by Lindenbaum’s Lemma. Since this holds for 
every t, and r has the V-property, r E VX((Y =+ v) for a choice of x not free in (Y. 
ByCUG,r~crjVx’x.SoV~y~T-(~)andsoT-(a)~Vxy,andso(appealing 
to Theorems 8.1 and 8.4(l)) r-(a) t- Vyy for any variable, and so r-(a) has the 
V-property. 
(2) Assume that r-(a) l- Z(A(t) 3 y(t)) for every term t. So for each term t 
there are {OY =+ yl,..., a!jy,}~rsuchthat(y~,...,y,}~Z(A(t)>y(t)).So 
k ,A& yi 1 Z(A(t) 3 y(t)>. From RCK, t- (a + yl A .~s A a =+ m) II a + 
Z(A(t) I y(t)>. Since {a =+ ~1,. . . , a + yn} c r, we obtain r I- 01+ Z(A(t) 3 
y(t)) for every term t. Since r has the V=-property, so r t- a =+ Z(V,x y (x)), Since 
r is maximal consistent, cz + Z(V,xy (x)) E r. Thus Z(V,xy (x)) E r-(a) and so 
r-(a) I- Z(V~‘,xy(x)) and r-(a) has the V,-property. q 
Theorem 8.5. Let r be a maximal consistent set offormulas with the V,Vc-property that 
contains a formula -(a, =+ j3). Then there is a maximal consistent set of formulas that 
includes r-(a) U {-,3) and has the V,VC-property. 
Proof. By Lemma 8.4, r-((Y) U (-/I) is consistent. By Lemma 8.5, r-(a) has the V,Vc- 
property. Lemma 8.3 gives the desired result. q 
For the following definitions let w, wt , . . . be maximal consistent sets of formulas, and 
let W be the set of maximal consistent sets of formulas. Anticipating Theorem 8.7, I refer 
to w, WI, . . . as worlds. The next definition gives a proof-theoretic analogue to 11 . II”‘. 
Definition 8.4. (ay(,,, = {w E W 1 a E w}. 
The following definition (again, defined in terms of maximal consistent sets of 
sentences) is designed to coincide with the similarly-named function, defined on sets of 
possible worlds. Use of the term “min” anticipates Theorem 8.8. 
Definition 8.5. min(w, /al,,,) = {WI E W I {/? ) a j fi E w) E WI). 
Definition 8.6. The canonical model is given by the following. M = (W, R, D, D’, V) 
where: 
(1) W = {w I w is a maximal consistent set of formulas with the V,Vc-property}. 
(2) For w, wt, w2 E W, Rww1w2 iff 
(a) there are y, 6 such that wl E min(w, Iyiw> and w2 E min(w. jSluI) and 
(b) for every cr, b such that wt E min(w, 1~11~) and w2 E min(w, lpllll) we have 
ffV/!?=%#?BW. 
(3) D is the set of terms. 
(4) D’(w) = {t I A(t) E w} for term t. 
(5) V is given by: for term t, V(t) = t. For n-place predicate symbol P, terms tl , . . . , 
t,,, and w E W, (tl, . . . , tn) E V(P, w) iff P(tl, . . . , t,) E w. 
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Theorem 8.6. 
(1) Vw E W andVw1 E W,, wehave Rwwlwl. 
(2) VW E W and VW], ~2, wg E W,, we have that if Rwwl w2 and R, ~2~3 then 
Rww1w3. 
Proof. 
(1) Assume wr E W,. For any u! where WI E min(w, Inlw> we have Ly v cx =+ LY E w, so 
Rwwlw~. 
(2) Assume that R, WI w2 and R, w2 w3. First, our construction guarantees that there is 
a formula cz such that wt E min(w, lalw>; similar comments apply to w2 and ~3. 
Since R,wiw2, for every cz, B where wt E min(w, ICY/~) and w2 E min(w, I#l/ro) 
we have cx v B + p E w. Similarly, since Rww2w3, if w2 E min(w, l,31u1) and 
w3 E min(w, Iylw) we have B v y + y E w. By Theorem 8.3.3, we have that 
(((w vfi + /I) A (/l v y =+ y)) > (CX v y + v) E w and since w is deductively closed, 
so ti v y 3 y E w. But this means that for every (z such that wt E min(w, /a/w) 
and for every v such that w3 E min(w, IylW) we have o v y =$ y E w, whence 
R,,wIw~. •I 
Theorem 8.7. The canonical model is, in fact, a QS-modei. 
Proof. Straightforward. W # 0 since, if we let Th(T) be the set of theorems, then 
Th(T) has the V,V,-property by Lemma 8.1. From Lemma 8.3, Th(T) U (cz), for arbitrary 
consistent cz, can be extended to a maximal consistent set with the V,Vc-property. R was 
shown to have the appropriate properties in Theorem 8.6. That D’(w) # 0 for every w E W 
follows from the fact that (via Ax) 3xA(x) E w: since 3xA(x) E w, so -V-xA(x) E w; 
so in Lemma 8.3, in the enumeration of formulas in the construction of w, where & 
is IV-xA(x) we add --A(t) to w, hence A(t), for some term t, from which by the 
definition of the canonical model t E D’(w), so D’(w) # 0. EI 
Theorem 8.8. Let M = (W, R, D, D’, V) be the canonical model. For any ok E &c and 
w E W we have M, w b (Y iffa E w. 
Proof. Note that the last condition in the theorem can be expressed as ((a! )I M = Ia! Iw. 
The proof is by induction on the composition of a formula. 
(1) If o is an atomic formula P(tl , . . . , t,), then for w E W we have M, w b 
P(t1, . . . , t,> iff W(td, . . . , V(t,)) E V(P, w) iff (tl,. .., t,) E V(P, w) iff P(tl, 
. . , tn) E w. 
(2) The proof for - and 1 is straightforward. 
(3) For =+, assume first that a! =+ j3 E w. By the induction hypothesis Iczl,,, = IIo\I”, 
so min(w, Ial,,,) = min(w, Ilall”). If wt E min(w, lalw) then by Definition 8.5 we 
have j? E WI. By the induction hypothesis M, WI + p and since this holds for all 
such w 1, by the definition of truth of =+ we obtain M, w l= a + /3. 
Conversely, assume that (II =+ p $ w. So -(a + fl) E w, since w is maximal 
consistent. By Theorem 8.5, w - (a) U {-B} has a maximal consistent extension w 1 
that has the V,Vc-property. By Definition 8.5, wt E min(w, la],). Since -p E WI so 
J.P: Delgrande /Art$cial Intelligence 105 (1998) 105-137 135 
B 4 WI. so WI G IBlw3 so by the induction hypothesis M, WI k j3, so M, w k a =+ 
B. 
(4) For V,, assume first that V~xcu(x) E w. We need to show that M, w b V,na, 
that is, for every V’ which is the same as V except V’(x) E D’(w) where M’ = 
(W, R, D, D’, V’), that M’, w /= a. So consider any V’ like V but where V’(x) E 
D’(w). There are two cases: 
(a) V’(x) = t for some term t free for x in (L. Since V,xcu(x) 2 (A(t) 3 a(t)) E w 
for t free for x in o (FUI), we have by modus ponens that A(t) I a(t) E UJ. 
By the induction hypothesis, M, w t-= A(t) > a(t) for t free for x in CX, and 
so M’, w b A(x) 3 a(x). Since M’, w b A(x) so by modus ponens M’, w b 
a(x). 
(b) V’(x) = y for some variable y for which x is not free in CX. Consider a bound 
alphabetic variant cr’ of (II such that Vcy does not occur in a’. We can safely 
replace free occurrences of x in crI’ by y, since no quantifier containing y 
occurs in 12. Since o and CX’ are bound alphabetic variants, by Theorem 8.1 
we have k V=xa = Vl,xo’, and since V,xa E w, so V,xcz’ E w. Now V,XCX’(X) > 
(A(y) > a’(y)) E w so by modus ponens, A(y) > a’(y) E w. By the induction 
hypothesis, we have M, w + A(y) II d(y), and so by the same argument as in 
the first part, M’, w b A(x) > a’(.~). Since o’ is a bound alphabetical variant 
of a, so M’, w + A(x) > a(x). Since M’, w b A(x) so by modus ponens 
M’, w + a(x). 
So we have shown that for every V’ the same as V except V’(x) E D’(w) where 
M’ = (W, R, D, D’, V’), that M’, w /= a. Thus, by the definition of V, we have 
M, w b V,xcr. 
Conversely, assume that Vcxa 6 w. Since w has the Vc-property, there must be some 
t such that A(t) 3 a(t) 4 w. By the induction hypothesis, M, w k A(t) I a(t). If 
V’ is exactly like V, except that V’(x) = V(t), then M’, w &t A(x) II a(x), and so 
M, w F v/cx(ll. 
This completes the case for V,. 
(5) V follows essentially as a simpler version of Vc. 0 
Theorem 8.9 (Completeness of QS). If b a! then I- LX. 
Proof. Let (II be a consistent formula, and let Th(T) be the set of theorems. Th(T) has the 
V,V,-property by Lemma 8.1. From Lemma 8.3,7’h(T) U {a} can be extended to a maximal 
consistent set with the V,V,-property. So, by Theorem 8.8, every consistent wff is true in 
some world in the canonical model. Similarly, every non-theorem is false in some world in 
the canonical model. Since the canonical model is a &S-model (Theorem 8.7), we obtain 
the desired result. q 
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